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ABSTRACT
Recent economic events have revived interest in the
economic long wave or Kondratiev cycle, a cycle of
economic expansion and depression lasting about fifty
years. Since 1975 the System Dynamics National Model
has provided an increasingly rich theory of the long
wave. The theory revolves around "self-ordering" of
capital, the dependence of the capital-producing sectors
of the economy, in the aggregate, on their own output.
The long-wave theory growing out of the National Model
relates capital investment, employment and workforce
participation, monetary and fiscal policy, inflation,
productivity and innovation, and even political values.
The advantage of the National Model is the rich detail
in which economic behavior is represented. However, the
complexity of the model makes it difficult to explain
the dynamic hypothesis underlying the long wave in a
concise manner.
This paper presents a simple model of the economic
long wave. The structure of-the model is shown to be
consistent with the principles of bounded rationality.
The behavior of the model is analyzed, and the role of
self-ordering in generating the long wave is determined.
The model complements the National Model by providing a
representation of the dynamic hypothesis that is
amenable to formal analysis and is easily extended to
include other important mechanisms that may influence
the nature of the long wave.
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Recent events have revived interest in the economic long wave,
sometimes known as the Kondratiev cycle, a cycle of economic expansion
and depression of approximately fifty years' duration.l Most students
of the subject date the troughs of the cycle as the 1830s, 1870s-1890s,
1930s, and possibly the 1980s.2 Originally proposed by Van Gelderen,
De Wolff, and Kondratiev Van Duijn 1983], early long-wave work was
based primarily on the detection of long cycles in economic time
series.
Early theories of long cycles stressed war and monetary factors
such as gold discoveries as causal factors [Tinbergen 1981]. Until
modern times, Schumpeter's [1939] long-wave theory was the most
complete and revolved around innovation.3 After languishing in the
postwar era, the late 1970s witnessed the emergence of long-wave
theories based on innovation [Delbeke 1981; Mensch et al. 1981, Mensch
1979], labor dynamics [Freeman 1979; Freeman et al. 1982], resource
scarcity [Rostow 1978, 1975], and capital accumulation and class
struggle [Mandel 1981, 1980]. As Ernest Mandel [1981, p. 332] notes,
It is amusing that the long waves of capitalist development
also produce long waves in the credibility of long-wave
theories, as well as additional long waves of these theories
themselves.
Yet despite the revival of interest, most economists reject the
idea of the long wave. The existence of at most four cycles and the
lack of reliable data for most of that period hampers empirical
studies. Most important, neoclassical theory is unable to account for
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a disequilibrium mode of behavior with a period of half a century. In
the absence of formal, testable theories of the long wave, economists
have correctly remained skeptical.
Since 1975 the System Dynamics National Model has provided an
increasingly rich theory of the long wave [Forrester 1981, 1979, 1977,
1976; Graham and Senge 1980; Senge 1982]. As discussed below, the core
of the theory is the "self-ordering" of capital by the capital sector
of the economy: the dependence of capital-producing industries, in the
aggregate, on their own output. But the long-wave theory growing out
of the National Model is not monocausal: it relates capital invest-
ment, employment and workforce participation, aggregate demand,
monetary and fiscal policy, inflation, debt, innovation and produc-
tivity, and even political values. The advantages of the National
Model are its wide boundary and the rich detail in which economic
behavior is represented. However, the complexity of the model and the
lack of published documentation make it difficult to explain the
dynamic hypothesis underlying the long wave in a simple and convincing
manner.
This paper presents a simple model of the economic long wave based
on the self-ordering hypothesis. The model demonstrates that self-
ordering can account for long waves, and isolates the minimum structure
sufficient to generate a long wave. In addition, the paper stresses
the role of bounded rationality in generating the long wave. It is
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shown that the decision rules represented in the model for managing
production, investment, and so on are locally rational. However, when
interacting in the context of the system as a whole, they produce
"irrational" behavior: periodic over- and underexpansion of the
economy.
The Dynamic Hypothesis: Self-Ordering
This section outlines the dynamic hypothesis of self-ordering and
sketches a conceptual model illustrating the most important mechanisms
that contribute to the long wave.4 Consider the economy divided into
two sectors: the capital sector and the goods sector. The
capital-producing industries of the economy (the construction, heavy
equipment, steel, mining, and other basic industries) supply each other
with the capital plant, equipment, and materials each needs to operate.
Viewed in the aggregate, the capital sector of the economy orders and
acquires capital from itself, hence self-ordering."
If the demand for consumer goods and services increases, the
consumer-goods industry must expand its capacity and so places orders
for new factories, equipment, vehicles, etc. To supply the higher
volume of orders, the capital-producing sector must also expand its
capital stock and hence places orders for more buildings, machines,
rolling stock, trucks, etc., causing the total demand for capital to
rise still further, a self-reinforcing spiral of increasing orders, a
greater need for expansion, and still more orders.5
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Figure 1 shows the most basic positive feedback loop created by
self-ordering. The strength of the self-ordering feedback depends on a
number of factors, but chiefly on the capital intensity (capital/output
ratio) of the capital-producing sector. A rough measure of the
strength of self-ordering can be calculated by considering how much
capital production expands in equilibrium in response to an increase in
investment in the rest of the economy.
Production of capital equals the investment in plant and equipment
of the goods sector plus the investment of the capital sector:
KPR = GINV+KINV (i)
where
KPR = Capital sector, production (capital units/year)
GINV = Goods sector, investment (capital units/year)
KINV = Capital sector, investment (capital units/year)
In equilibrium, investment equals physical depreciation. If the
average lifetime of capital (the aggregate of plant and equipment) were
twenty years, one-twentieth of the capital stock would have to be
replaced each year. Thus
KINV = KC/KALC (ii)
where
KC = Capital sector, capital stock (capital units)
KALC = Capital sector, average life of capital (years)
The capital stock KC is related to capital production KPR by the
capital/output ratio KCOR (years):
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KC = KPR*KCOR (iii)
Substituting for KINV and KC yields
KPR = GINV*([ KCOR. (iv)
KALC(
Equation (iv) indicates how much capital production must increase in
the long run when the investment needs of the rest of the economy rise,
taking into account the extra capital needed to maintain the capital
sector's own stock at the higher level. Assuming an average life of
capital of twenty years and an average capital/output ratio of three
years (approximate values for the aggregate economy), the expression
above yields a multiplier effect of 1.18: in the long run, an increase
in investment in the rest of the economy yields an additional 18%
increase in total investment through self-ordering.
The long wave is an inherently disequilibrium phenomenon, however,
and during the transient adjustment to the long run the strength of
self-ordering is greater than in equilibrium. As shown in Figure 2, an
increase in orders for capital not only increases the steady-state rate
of output required, but, because production of capital lags behind
orders, depletes the inventories and swells the backlogs of the capital
sector. To correct the imbalance, firms must expand output above the
order rate, causing desired capital to expand further, and further
swelling the total demand for capital. Production must remain above
orders long enough to restore inventories and backlogs to normal
levels.
6
D-3410 7
Production lags behind orders for several reasons. It takes time
for firms to recognize that an unanticipated change in demand is
permanent enough to warrant a change in output. And once desired
output rises, it takes time to increase employment and especially to
increase capacity.
The disequilibrium pressures of low inventory and high backlog can
significantly amplify the effect of an unanticipated change in demand,
further strengthening the basic self-ordering loop.6 Other mechanisms
create additional amplification: when orders for capital exceed
production, delivery times begin to rise. Faced with longer lead times
and spot-shortages of specialized equipment, firms must hedge by
ordering farther ahead and placing orders with more than one supplier,
a process described by Thomas W. Mitchell in 1923 p. 645]:
Retailers find that there is a shortage of merchandise at
their sources of supply. Manufacturers inform them that it
is with great regret that they are able to fill their orders
only to the extent of 80 per cent; there has been an unac-
countable shortage of materials that has prevented them from
producing to their full capacity. They hope to be able to
give full service next season, by which time, no doubt, these
unexplainable conditions will have been remedied. However,
retailers, having been disappointed in deliveries and lost 20
per cent or more of their possible profits thereby, are not
going to be caught that way again. If they want 90 units of
an article, they order 100, so as to be sure, each, of
getting the 90 in the pro rata share delivered. Probably
they are disappointed a second time. Hence they increase the
margins of their orders over what they desire, in order that
their pro rata shares shall be for each the full 100 per cent
that he really wants. Furthermore, to make doubly sure, each
merchant spreads his orders over more sources of supply.
III
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The hoarding phenomenon described by Mitchell is quite common, most
recently contributing to the gasoline crisis of 1979 [Neff 1982].
For the aggregate capital sector, however, ordering farther ahead
to compensate for a rising lead time adds to the total demand for
capital, causing lead times to rise still further and creating still
more pressure to order (Figure 3).
Other sources of amplification include growth expectations--the
spread of optimism and pessimism--as described by Wesley Mitchell
(1941, p. 5]:
Virtually all business problems involve elements that are not
precisely known, but must be approximately estimated even for
the present, and forecast still more roughly for the future.
Probabilities take the place of certainties, both among the
data upon which reasoning proceeds and among the conclusions
at which it arrives. This fact gives hopeful or despondent
moods a large share in shaping business decisions....Most men
find their spirits raised by being in optimistic company.
Therefore, when the first beneficiaries of a trade revival
develop a cheerful frame of mind about the business outlook,
they become centers of infection, and start an epidemic of
optimism.
To the extent expectations of future growth lead to expansion of
investment, self-ordering ensures the demand for capital will in fact
rise, validating and strengthening the forecast of continued growth
(Figure 4).
Interactions with the labor market further strengthen self-
ordering (Figure 5). To boost output, the capital sector expands
8
D-3410
employment as well as its capital stock. As the pool of unemployed is
drawn down, the labor market tightens and wages rise. Scarcity of
skilled workers and higher labor costs encourage the substitution of
capital for labor throughout the economy, further augmenting the demand
for capital. Thus one would expect the early phases of a long wave to
involve expansion of labor and capital together, followed by a period
of stagnant employment but continued growth in capital and output.
Such patterns emerge from simulations of the National Model and have
been documented for both the U.S., Europe, and Japan [Freeman 1979;
Freeman et al. 1982; Graham and Senge 1980; Senge 1982].
Still more amplification is due to interactions with the financial
markets (Figure 6). Rising capital demand boosts prices and
profitability, leading to expansion of existing firms and the entry of
new firms. In addition, the expansion of the asset and earnings base
of the capital sector increases the external financing available for
expansion. It is through these channels that monetary policy will
influence the long wave, by providing (or withholding) credit
sufficient to finance the demand for investment. Further amplification
can be added if, as investment slows near the peak of a long wave, the
monetary authority expands credit and lowers interest rates in an
effort to buoy up the boom.7
Additional amplification arises from the familiar consumption
multiplier: the expansion of the capital sector's output and
9
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employment boosts aggregate income, which feeds back to further
stimulate investment demand by augmenting the demand for consumer goods
and housing (Figure 7).
Interactions between self-ordering and innovation, international
trade, and political values also exist and may further amplify the long
wave.
According to the theory derived from the National Model, the net
effect of the positive feedback loops described above is to
significantly amplify the basic self-ordering loop. Once a capital
expansion gets under way, these loops sustain it until production
catches up to orders, excess capital is built up, and orders begin to
fall. At that point, the loops reverse: a reduction in orders further
reduces investment demand, leading to a contraction in the capital
sector's output and declining employment, wages, aggregate demand, and
output. Capital production must remain below the level required for
replacement and long-run growth until the excess physical and financial
capital is depreciated--a process that may take a decade or more due to
the long lifetimes of plant and equipment. Once the capital stock is
worn out, investment rises, triggering the next upswing.
Figure 8 shows a typical series of long waves generated by the
National Model. 9 The simulation exhibits the short-term (4- to 7-year)
10
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business cycle as well as a 48- to 56-year long wave. Several features
of the simulation bear comment:
1. The long wave is strongest in the capital sector, while
the goods sector is relatively unaffected.
2. Capital stock in the capital sector peaks after production
(due to construction delays) and declines slowly,
depressing capital production.
3. The delivery delay for capital peaks before the peak of
production.
The preceding discussion does not comprise a complete model of the
long wave. Many important relationships have been omitted. Rather,
the relationships above constitute a dynamic hypothesis--the essential
feedback structure believed to be important in the genesis of the long
wave. To be a useful hypothesis, the importance of self-ordering must
be evaluated in a formal model that permits reproducible tests to be
made. Further, the relative importance of the various self-ordering
loops must be evaluated. The model developed below is used to address
the following questions:
1. Is self-ordering sufficient to produce a long wave?
2. What factors control the period and amplitude of the long
wave?
3. What nonlinearities are important in causing the long
wave?
4. How might mechanisms excluded from the model alter its
behavior?
Bounded Rationality
Before proceeding to the model, this section reviews the behavioral
underpinnings of the theory. The model presented below is based in
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part on the theory of bounded rationality [Cyert and March 1963; March
1978; Merton 1936; Nelson and Winter 1982; Simon 1947, 1957, 1978,
1979]. The essence of the theory is summarized in the principle of
bounded rationality, as formulated by Herbert Simon [1957, p. 198]:
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the
problem whose solution is required for objectively rational
behavior in the real world or even for a reasonable approxi-
mation to such objective rationality.
The theory of bounded rationality is supported by an extremely large
and diverse body of empirical research, which not only documents the
limitations of human information processing, but highlights the system-
atic biases and errors deeply embedded in the heuristics people use to
make decisions. While a complete catalogue of bounded rationality in
its many guises is beyond the purpose of this paper, those aspects most
important for theories of economic behavior in general and for this
paper in particular can be stated quite simply.1 0
1. Limited information-processing capability. Humans have a
limited ability to process information. As a consequence, "perception
of information is not comprehensive but selective" [Hogarth 1980, p. 4;
emphasis in original]. For both physiological and psychological
reasons, people take only a very few factors or cues into account when
making decisions. Further, the cues that are taken into account are
not those with the best predictive ability. Rather, people focus on
cues they judge to be relatively certain, systematically excluding
uncertain or remote information regardless of its importance [Hogarth
12
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1980, p. 36; Kahneman et al. 1982, esp. Ch. 4, 7-10]. Additionally,
since "people give more weight to data that they consider causally
related to a target object...," they focus on cues they believe to be
meaningful [Hogarth 1980, p. 42-43, emphasis in original]. However,
precisely because of limited information-procesSing capability and the
aversion to uncertainty, people are notoriously poor judges of causal-
ity and correlation, and in controlled experiments systematically
create mental models at variance with the known situation. Ironical-
ly, "people tend to believe that they pay attention to many cues,
although models based on only a few cues can reproduce their judgements
to a high degree of accuracy" [Hogarth 1980, p. 48]. Though sometimes
aware of the pitfalls in judgment and inference, people, including many
professionally trained in statistics, consistently assert that their
own performances are immune, are reluctant to abandon their mental
models and selectively use hindsight to "validate" their mental
models.12
2. Decentralized decisionmaking. As a consequence of limited
information-processing ability, organizations (and the individuals
within them) divide the total task of the organization into smaller
units. By establishing subgoals assigned to subunits within the
organization, the complexity of the total problem is vastly reduced.
The subunits in the hierarchy ignore, or treat as constant or
exogenous, those aspects of the total situation that are not directly
related to their subgoal [Simon 1947, p. 79]:
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Individual choice takes place in an environment of givens"--
premises that are accepted by the subject as bases for his
choice....
Limited information-processing ability also forces people within
organizational subunits to evolve simple heuristics or rules of thumb
to make decisions. The rules of thumb rely on relatively certain
information that is locally available to the subunit. Rules of thumb
are also computationally simple [Morecroft 1983, p. 133]:
In the short run, these procedures do not change, and
represent the accumulated learning embodied in the factored
decisionmaking of the organization. Rules of thumb need
employ only small amounts of information....Rules of thumb
process information in a straightforward manner, recognizing
the computational limits of normal human decision makers
under pressure of time.
Such factoring is central to the management of all but the
smallest enterprises. Indeed, organization, as Simon [1947, p. 80]
states, "permits the individual to approach reasonably near to
objective rationality." The implicit assumption (necessitated by the
complexity of the total situation and the limited time available for
decisionmaking) is that the task is separable in the sense that
achieving the subgoals ensures attainment of the larger goal.
The Model
The model will be presented in several stages. First, a simplified,
generic model of a firm or sector of the economy will be developed (the
"production sector"). It will be shown, through partial model tests,
that the decision rules for production and investment yield rational
14
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behavior in the simplified environment presumed by each subunit of the
organization. The model will then be used to represent the aggregate
capital-producing sector of the economy, including self-ordering.
Finally, simulation experiments will be used to establish the relative
contribution of the structural and parametric assumptions to the
resulting long-wave behavior.1 3
PRt=PCt*CUt
CUt=f1 (IPt/PCt)
IPt=Bt/NDD
where PR
PC
CU
IP
B
NDD
f1(0)=0, fl(l)=l, f 1 1>0, f ''<0
= Production rate (units/year)
= Production capacity (units/year)
= Capacity utilization (fraction)
= Indicated production (units/year)
= Backlog of unfilled orders (units)
= Normal delivery delay (years)
Equations 1 through 3 describe production and capacity utilization.
Production rate PR is determined by production capacity PC and the rate
of capacity utilization CU. Capacity utilization is determined by the
ratio of indicated production to production capacity, a measure of
demand relative to supply. Indicated production represents the rate of
production that would be required to deliver an order with the normal
(1)
(2)
(3)
III
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delivery delay NDD. The normal delivery delay represents the time
required, in equilibrium, to process, produce, and deliver an order.
As shown in Figure 9, capacity utilization varies nonlinearly with
the ratio IP/PC. When IP/PC>l, the rate of production required to meet
the normal delivery delay exceeds capacity, which becomes a binding
constraint on production. If indicated production drops below
capacity, however, output is curtailed. (Since inventories are not
represented, production and shipments are always equal, and if there
are no orders to be filled, production must decline to zero unless one
assumes firms simply throw the extra output away.) If firms wanted to
maintain the normal delivery delay regardless of capacity, capacity
utilization would fall in proportion to the decline in demand,
production would equal indicated production, and CU would lie along
line A. If firms wanted to continue to operate at full capacity at all
times, even in the face of diminished demand, utilization would fall
only when the sector was producing at the minimum delivery delay,
defined by line B.14 Capacity utilization is specified as a compromise
between these two extremes: if indicated production drops below
capacity, firms are assumed to reduce utilization only slightly,
preferring to maintain relatively full utilization (and hence revenues)
by drawing down their backlogs. Delivery delays would become shorter
than normal. If backlog continued to fall, utilization would be cut
back, but at less than proportional rates, until firms were producing
at the minimum delivery delay. Further declines in backlog then force
16
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proportional reductions in output. The behavior described by the
capacity utilization formulation is illustrated by the following
description of the machine tool industry [Business Week, 14 March 1982,
p. 20]:
Bad as they are, shipments are outpacing orders by a very
wide margin, forcing a continued rundown in the industry's
order backlog....At the average shipment rate of the past
three months, backlogs provide less than six months of
production, in an industry that had a one-year backlog when
the recession began....the low level of capacity utilization
suggests that shipments will run ahead of orders well into
summer.
PCt=Ct/COR (4)
where C = Capital stock (capital units)
COR = Capital/output ratio (years)
Production capacity is determined by capital and the capital/out-
put ratio. For simplicity, capital is the only explicit factor of
production, and the capital/output ratio is assumed fixed, implicitly
assuming other factors (particularly labor) are freely available.1 5
Ct t (CAt-CDt)dt + Ct(5)t
o
where CA = Capital acquisitions (capital units/year)
CD = Capital discards (capital units/year)
Capital stock, representing both plant and equipment, is the
accumulation of capital acquisitions CA less capital discards CD.
17
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CDt=Ct/ALC (6)
The simplest formulation for capital discards is to assume all units
have an equal probability of being discarded regardless of age,
defining (in equilibrium) an exponential probability density for the
age of individual units, with the mean physical life given by the
average life of capital ALC. For simplicity, the average lifetime is
assumed constant.16
CAt=SLt/DDCt (7)
where SL = Supply line of unfilled orders for capital (capital units)
DDC = Delivery delay for capital (years)
Capital acquisition, or gross investment, is determined by the sector's
supply line or backlog of unfilled orders for capital (including
capital under construction) and the average delay in acquiring those
units (including the time required for construction). In general, the
delivery delay for capital will vary according to the capacity of the
supplying industries relative to the demand.
SLt= f (COt-CAt)dt + SLt (8)t 
where CO = capital orders (capital units/year).
18
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The sector's supply line is augmented as orders for capital are placed
with suppliers, and is diminished when construction is completed and
the capital enters the productive stock of the sector.
COt=Ct*COFt (9)
COFt=f 2(ICOFt) f2'>0 (10)
ICOFt= (CDt+CCt+CSLt) /Ct (11)
where COF = Capital order fraction (fraction/year)
ICOF = Indicated capital order fraction (fraction/year)
CC = Correction to orders from capital stock (capital
units/year)
CSL = Correction to orders from supply line (capital units/year)
Though capital acquisition corresponds to investment, it is the
order rate for capital that determines acquisitions. Three motivations
for ordering capital are assumed: First, to replace discards; second,
to correct any discrepancy between the desired and actual capital
stock; and third, to correct any discrepancy between the desired and
actual supply line.1 7 The sum of these three pressures, as a fraction
of the existing capital stock, defines the indicated capital order
fraction ICOF. However, in extreme circumstances the indicated capital
order fraction may take on unreasonable values. For example, an
extreme excess of capacity could cause ICOF to be negative. As shown
in Figure 10, the actual order fraction COF is a nonlinear function of
19
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the indicated order fraction. -Since gross investment must be positive,
COF asymptotically approaches zero as ICOF drops below 5%/year.1 8
Similarly, if demand far exceeds capacity, the indicated order fraction
may take on unreasonably large values. It is assumed that the maximum
capital order fraction is 30% of the capital stock per year. The limit
reflects physical constraints to rapid expansion such as labor and
materials bottlenecks, financial constraints, and organizational
19pressures.
CSLt=(DSLt-SLt)/TASL (12)
DSLt=CDt*PDDCt (13)
PDDCt =DDCt (14)
where DSL = Desired supply line (capital units)
TASL = Time to adjust supply line (years)
PDDC = Perceived delivery delay for capital (years)
DDC = Delivery delay for capital (years)
Equations 12 through 14 describe the management of the supply line.
Firms strive to eliminate discrepancies between the desired and actual
supply line within the time to adjust supply line TASL. To ensure an
appropriate acquisition rate, firms must maintain a supply line
proportional to the delivery delay they face in acquiring capital: as
described by Mitchell 1923], if the delivery delay rises, firms must
plan for and order new capital farther ahead, increasing the required
D-3410
supply line. The desired supply line is based on relatively certain
information: the discard rate and the delivery delay for capital
perceived by the firm. For simplicity, delays in perceiving the true
lead time for capital are not represented, thus the perceived delivery
delay for capital is assumed to equal the actual delivery delay.
However, the relationship between delivery delay and the desired supply
line is likely to be highly nonlinear: as Mitchell notes, initially a
change in delivery delay may produce a more than proportional change in
orders due to hoarding and panic. And rather than expand orders
continually as lead times rise, chronically high delivery delays would
eventually cause firms to seek substitutes, limiting the desired supply
line. The sensitivity of the model to the decision rule for desired
supply line is tested below.
CCt=(DCt-Ct)/TAC (15)
DCt=RC*f3(ICt/RC) f 3( )=, f f3 110, (16)
ICt =IPC t*COR (17)
where DC = Desired capital (capital units)
TAC = Time to adjust capital (years)
RC = Reference capital (capital units)
IC = Indicated capital (capital units)
IPC = Indicated production capacity (units/year)
21
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Equations 15 through 17 describe the adjustment of capacity to
desired levels. Like the supply line correction, firms attempt to
correct discrepancies between desired and actual capital stock over a
period of time given by the time to adjust capital. Desired capital is
nonlinearly related to the indicated capital stock, which is the stock
needed to provide the indicated production capacity IPC. (Indicated
production capacity is the capacity judged necessary to meet expected
demand.) As shown in Figure 11, diminishing returns to capital are
assumed to set in when IC becomes large relative to a reference level
of capital RC (set at the initial equilibrium of the system). Though
labor is not explicitly represented, the linear range of the relation-
ship between IC and DC implies employment can be expanded in proportion
to capital. As the available labor supply is exhausted, however,
further expansion of capital lowers the marginal productivity of
capital and diminishes incentives for further expansion even if demand
remains high.
IPCt=EOt+CBt (18)
CBt=(Bt-IBt)/TAB (19)
IBt=NDD*EOt (20)
where EO = Expected orders (units/year)
CB = Correction from backlog (units/year)
IB = Indicated backlog (units)
TAB = Time to adjust backlog (years)
22
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Equations 18 through 20 determine indicated production capacity.
Indicated production capacity reflects the capacity the sector judges
necessary both to fill expected orders EO and adjust the backlog of
unfilled orders to an appropriate level. The speed with which the
sector strives to correct discrepancies between the actual and
indicated backlog is determined by the time to adjust backlog, a
reflection of the sector's sensitivity to abnormal delivery delays.
Indicated backlog is the backlog that would be necessary to fill the
expected order rate within the normal delivery delay.
t
(OR -EO )
EOt T= -- dt + EO (21)
t TAO t
where TAO = Time to average orders.
The expected order rate represents the sector's forecast of demand
conditional on available information and the rules of thumb for fore-
casting used by the sector. The firm is assumed to forecast demand by
averaging past orders. Orders are averaged because it takes time for
firms to decide that an unanticipated change in demand is lasting
enough to warrant capacity expansion. The averaging serves to filter
out short-term noise in demand, providing a more certain measure of
long-run demand than the raw order rate, and preventing wild swings in
investment by allowing the backlog to buffer the system from the
short-term variability of demand. First-order exponential smoothing is
assumed for the averaging process. The smoothing time is given by the
time to average orders TAO.20
23
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DDt=Bt/PRt (22)
t
Bt (ORt-PRt)dt + Bt (23)
Ut 0
ORt = exogenous (24)
DDCt=NDD (25)
Finally, the delivery delay for the sector's output, or average
residence time of an order in the backlog, is given by the ratio of
backlog to production. The backlog of unfilled orders accumulates
orders less shipments (production). The order rate is assumed
exogenous; delivery delay for capital is exogenous and assumed
constant.
The parameter values assumed for the analysis are summarized in
Table 1. The parameters were chosen to represent a producer of capital
goods. The parameters are broadly consistent with survey and
econometric evidence reported in various studies. But because the
model excludes all but the most basic channels through which self-
ordering operates, precise estimation is not warranted. The
sensitivity of the model to the key parameters is analyzed below.
The Local Rationality of the Decision Rules
The behavioral formulations in the model conform to the principles of
bounded rationality: management of the firm is broken down into
24
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several distinct decisions (production, investment, demand forecasting,
etc.). The individual decision rules rely on locally available,
relatively certain information. For example, desired production
capacity relies on the backlog and average orders rather than the
current and less certain order rate. Similarly, the desired supply
line requires knowledge only of the replacement rate of investment and
the delivery delay for capital experienced by the firm, and does not
consider the condition of capital suppliers or the effect demand
changes might have on availability. Simple rules of thumb are used to
determine how much capital to keep on order, how fast to adjust
production capacity, and how to manage backlogs. To test the local or
intended rationality of the decision rules, this section describes
partial model tests of the production and investment decisions. A
minimum requirement for intended rationality is that the individual
decision rules respond well to shocks when the decision rules are
tested in isolation.
1. Demand Forecasting and Backlog Management: Equations 18 through 21
describe the demand forecasting procedure and determination of desired
capacity. To test the intended rationality of this decision rule, the
sector was subjected to a sudden, unanticipated increase in orders of
five percent at the start of year one. To isolate the decision rule,
it was assumed that
III
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PRt=IPCt (1)
Capacity then places no constraint on production, and the production
scheduling equations become the only determinants of the sector's
behavior.
The result (Figure 12) is a smooth and orderly response.
Immediately after the shock, expected orders and production are
unchanged and the backlog begins to rise. As backlog rises, however,
firms recognize the growing discrepancy between the backlog and the
backlog consistent with the normal delivery delay. Production is
adjusted above expected orders by exactly enough to keep delivery delay
constant. Simultaneously, as management comes to believe the new level
of demand will persist, expected orders rise, gradually shifting the
burden of adjustment from the correction from backlog to the demand
forecast. 2 1 The response is extremely rational in the sense that:
it is appropriate--in equilibrium, expected output, output, and backlog
have all expanded by five percent. It is also orderly--expected
orders, production, and backlog all smoothly approach their new
equilibrium values. Even though expected orders lag behind actual
orders, delivery delay remains constant at its normal value. The
expected order rate covers 95% of the initial discrepancy in six years.
Production covers 95% of the initial discrepancy within 4.5 years.
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2. Investment and Capacity Acquisition: Equations 5 through 17
describe the determinants of investment and capacity acquisition. To
test the local rationality of this decision rule, it is assumed that
indicated production capacity is exogenous. The sector is subjected to
a sudden, unanticipated increase in indicated production capacity of
five percent in year one. It is assumed the sector faces a constant
delivery delay for capital, eliminating the possibility of bottlenecks
in the supplying industry.
Again, the response (Figure 13) is smooth and orderly. Immediate-
ly after the shock, there is a maximum discrepancy between desired and
actual capital, and orders for capital rise to a peak. As the supply
line fills, the order rate drops, for even though the capital stock
does not increase immediately, the units ordered but not yet received
are taken into account when placing future orders. Overordering, an
obvious source of instability, is thus prevented. As the supply line
rises, so too do acquisitions, which peak two years after the shock.
As capital increases the burden of investment shifts back to replace-
ments, and in equilibrium the desired and actual stock are again equal
(likewise the desired and actual supply line). Like the production
scheduling equations, the response is extremely rational: the
adjustment is appropriate, orderly, and essentially completed (over
95%) within twelve years.
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3. Testing the Complete Production Sector: The partial model tests
show that the decision rule for investment can track changes in desired
capacity without overshoot or instability. Similarly, the production
scheduling decision can accommodate unanticipated changes in demand
smoothly and without disruption. The next test examines the ability of
the entire sector to respond to a change in demand. In the test, the
sector faces a five percent unanticipated increase in orders at the
start of year one. The delivery delay for capital is assumed constant.
The result (Figure 14) is a highly damped oscillation with a
period of about twenty years. In contrast to the previous tests,
production and capacity now overshoot orders, then undershoot slightly
before reaching equilibrium. Because capacity (and production) lag
behind orders, the backlog (and delivery delay) must rise. When
production equals orders (in year six), backlog stops increasing and
reaches its maximum. Delivery delay peaks slightly earlier. In order
to reduce delivery delay to normal levels, production and capacity must
continue to expand above orders. By year eight, delivery delay is once
again normal, but production still rises due to growing capacity and
industry reluctance to reduce utilization. By year ten, backlog has
fallen enough to begin to force utilization down, but because firms
prefer to maintain full utilization, output continues to exceed orders,
and delivery delay falls below normal as firms draw down their backlogs
to preserve profitability. Faced with excess capacity, investment is
cut back, and by the twelfth year, capacity begins to decline. For
· I
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delivery delay to return to normal, the backlog must rise, forcing
output and capacity below orders. But when delivery delay has returned
to normal, capacity is once again insufficient, triggering a second,
though much smaller, overshoot.
The test shows that as the complexity of the system grows relative
to the simplifying assumptions and decision rules used by the subsec-
tors of the organization, the rationality of the organization's re-
sponse to change is degraded. Yet despite the overshoot, the system's
response is, on the whole, still rather rational. The majority of the
behavior is a direct consequence of the physical constraints facing the
firms in the sector. Since production must lag behind orders, backlogs
must initially rise. Therefore output and capacity must exceed orders
to bring backlog back down. Overshoot is an inevitable consequence of
the lags in expanding output. Oscillation, however, is not: the
existence of oscillation is a consequence of decentralized decision-
making and the aggressiveness with which people attempt to correct
perceived imbalances. Still, the system exhibits a high degree of
damping (93% of the cycle is damped each period). And though output
rises to a peak 65% greater than the change in orders, rising delivery
delays are arrested within four years, production settles within 2% of
its equilibrium value after fifteen years, and utilization never drops
below 97%. The behavior represents a good compromise between a speedy
response and stability.2 2
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Testing the Dynamic Hypothesis
Having established the local rationality of the subsectors of the
model, the production sector can now be used to test the dynami-
hypothesis behind the long wave. To do so, the production sector is
used to represent the capital-producing sector of the aggregate
economy. The following equations are added or modified to implement
the test:
Bt=GSLt+SLt (23')
ORt=GCOt+COt (24)
DDCt=DDt (25')
t
GSLt= | (GORt-GCAt)dt + GSLt (26)
GCAt GSLt/DDCt (27)
GCOt-=exogenous (28)
where GOR = Goods sector, capital order rate (units/year)
GSL = Goods sector, supply line of unfilled orders (units/year)
GCA = Goods sector, capital acquisition rate (units/year)
The total demand for capital (eq. 24') is now composed of two parts:
an exogenous order rate for capital deriving from the goods sector of
the economy (all noncapital industries) and the self-ordering com-
ponent: the capital sector's own orders for capital. The backlog of
the sector (eq. 23') becomes the sum of the supply lines of the goods
and capital sectors. The supply line of the goods sector (eq. 26)
_lal____l_____l____---_ll_
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accumulates the goods sector's orders for capital less acquisitions,
which are determined by the delivery delay for capital (eq. 27). A
direct consequence of self-ordering is that the delivery delay for
capital faced by the capital sector is the time required to produce its
own output (eq. 25'). In addition, it is assumed that each order in
the backlog has an equal probability of being filled. As a conse-
quence, the output of the capital sector is divided between the goods
and capital sectors in proportion to their supply lines, implying the
priority of the two sectors is equal.
Finally, note that the order rate for capital from the goods
sector is exogenous. Thus only the most basic self-ordering mechanisms
shown in Figures 1-3 are included. The self-ordering feedback loops
that operate through growth expectations, labor markets, prices,
financial markets, and aggregate demand (Figures 4-7) are not included.
The model was subjected to an unanticipated increase in orders for
capital from the goods sector of one percent (a less than one-percent
change in total capital demand). The response (Figure 15) is a
large-amplitude limit cycle with a steady-state period of forty-nine
years. Figure 16 shows one complete cycle drawn from the steady-state
region of Figure 15. The gross qualitative features of the behavior
correspond to the long wave produced by the full National Model (Figure
8):
1. The cycle has a period substantially longer than the busi-
ness or Kuznets cycle and more than double the period of
the production sector in isolation without self-ordering.
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2. Output rises slowly as capital is accumulated but falls
precipitously, followed by a long depression while the
excess capital depreciates. Capital peaks after output.
3. The delivery delay for capital peaks before the peak of
output.
4. The cycle is a limit cycle that persists without
continuous exogenous triggering.
To clarify the sources of the behavior, consider the sequence of events
shown in Figure 16. In the 110th year, the capital sector has excess
capacity and is primarily producing for the goods sector. Net
investment in the capital sector is negative, and capacity is falling.
As a result, utilization is rising. In approximately the 118th year,
capacity and orders become equal, but because backlog and delivery
delay are below normal, output remains depressed. Capacity continues
to fall until by year 120, capacity and output become equal, utiliza-
tion reaches one hundred percent, and delivery delay becomes normal.
However, the sector is not in equilibrium because capacity has fallen
below orders, just as in the test of the sector without self-ordering.
However, unlike the response of the sector in isolation, capacity
and output do not then rise smoothly to equilibrium, but continue to
expand well beyond the equilibrium level of output. Self-ordering is
directly responsible, through several channels.
Up until year 118, excess capacity meant the sector's gross
investment was less than discards. As capacity falls towards orders,
orders for capital rise to the replacement level. Acquisitions,
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however, lag behind by the delivery delay. As a result, capacity falls
below orders, and delivery delay rises above normal. Additional orders
are placed to correct this discrepancy, swelling the backlog of the
sector, increasing desired output and causing still more orders for
capital. This most basic of the self-ordering loops is the inevitable
consequence of the fact that capital is an input to its own production.
As orders for capital are placed in an attempt to reduce the
discrepancy between demand and capacity, self-ordering acts to increase
the discrepancy by expanding desired production with each new order.
The sector chases its own shadow.
Second, because capacity is inadequate, delivery delay rises above
normal. Thus as capital producers attempt to expand, they find capital
acquisitions lagging further behind orders. As a result, capacity
expands less rapidly than anticipated, widening the gap between desired
and actual capital, causing still more orders to be placed, and further
lengthening the delivery delay.
Third, faced with lengthening lead times, capital producers
attempt to compensate by ordering further ahead, allowing orders to
expand still further.
As a consequence, though output begins to grow rapidly, demand
grows more rapidly, and the delivery delay rises. Within eight years
capital acquisitions have expanded enough to allow capacity to gain
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ground on demand. By the 128th year, output is expanding as fast as
orders, and delivery delay reaches its maximum value. The sector's
output now rapidly begins to catch up to orders, though orders, through
self-ordering, continue to rise even though they are now well above the
equilibrium level. By the 132nd year, output overtakes orders and
backlog reaches its peak. Delivery delay is now falling, reducing
orders by accelerating acquisitions and reducing the required supply
line. But though orders are now falling, backlog and delivery delay
remain well above normal, forcing capacity to expand further. By the
134th year, delivery delay and backlog have returned to normal, but
capacity is much higher than its equilibrium level.
With output at record levels and orders plummeting, backlog and
delivery delay reach and then drop below their normal values as firms
attempt to maintain full utilization. The backlog is rapidly depleted,
however, and utilization is forced down. Output drops precipitously,
and the sector enters a period of depression with capacity far in
excess of demand. Note that capacity continues to rise even after
output has fallen. Though the sector's orders for capital peak in year
131 and then fall precipitously, capital already ordered continues to
arrive, worsening overcapacity.23 And since the lead time for capital
drops below normal, capital on order is delivered faster than expected,
expanding capacity beyond anticipated levels.
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With its backlog depleted and capacity utilization at 25%, the
sector has, by year 139, cut gross investment to zero. Output and
gross investment remain depressed for the next two decades as capacity
slowly depreciates, until capacity once again equals orders and the
cycle begins again.
Comment on the Realism of the Behavior
The long cycle generated by the model with self-ordering closely
resembles, in qualitative terms, the long wave generated by the
National Model. But the magnitude of the fluctuation is extreme:
delivery delay expands to over 250% of normal; capacity utilization
falls to a minimum of under 25%; total gross investment falls by over
75% from the peak with investment in the capital sector collapsing to
zero. In comparison, between 1929 and 1933, U.S. real private in-
vestment fell 88%, real GNP fell by 30%, and unemployment reached 25%.
The extreme simplicity of the model is the cause of the extreme
behavior. Since only the most basic channels for self-ordering are
represented, the full burden of the disequilibrium pressures generated
during the cycle must be borne by a few variables. One would expect
that as additional structure and realism are added to the model, the
burden borne by any individual channel would fall while the total
amplification, to a first approximation, stayed the same. For example,
the model excludes relative prices. In reality, as demand outstrips
capacity, the price of capital would rise, easing some of the pressure
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on delivery delay by damping demand growth. At the same time, higher
capital prices would encourage expansion and reinforce self-ordering
through the mechanisms outlined in Figure 6. Given the extreme
simplicity of the model, extensive comparison of the magnitudes of the
variables to historical experience is not warranted.
The Role of Self-Ordering
The strength of self-ordering in equilibrium is governed primarily by
the capital/output ratio. As calculated in equation (iv), the equi-
librium multiplier effect created by self-ordering is given by
1/(1-COR/ALC). Thus reducing the capital/output ratio should reduce
both the amplitude and period of the cycle by reducing the magnitude of
the capacity overshoot and hence the time required for capacity to
depreciate. Table 2 shows period, amplitude, and damping as a function
of COR given the other parameters of the model. When COR '_ 0, self-
ordering is eliminated, and the behavior approaches that of the sector
in isolation with a period of twenty years and a damping ratio of 93%.
As COR rises, damping falls dramatically while the period remains rela-
tively constant. At COR 1.6, damping is eliminated and the oscilla-
tion reaches a fixed steady-state amplitude. Further increases in COR
rapidly lengthen the period and boost the amplitude. The results veri-
fy the crucial role of self-ordering in lengthening the natural period
of the accelerator mechanism portrayed in the production sector.
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The other determinant of the strength of self-ordering is the
average life of capital ALC. Altering ALC has two opposing effects.
On the one hand, ALC controls the time required for excess capacity to
depreciate during the depression phase, so shortening ALC should reduce
the period. But shortening ALC also increases the strength of
self-ordering, suggesting a larger amplitude. Table 3 shows that the
amplitude is increased substantially as ALC falls. The period,
however, is quite insensitive to ALC, and in fact tends to shrink as
ALC gets shorter or longer. Though a shorter ALC implies faster decay
of excess capacity, more rapid depreciation makes it more difficult for
the capital sector to catch up to orders during the expansion phase.
Output overtakes demand at a later and higher level, so even though
excess capacity is eliminated more rapidly, more excess capacity is
generated, resulting in a reduction in period of only six years when
ALC is reduced from twenty to ten years. Similarly, a longer ALC
extends the time required to eliminate excess capacity but reduces the
strength of self-ordering so that output overtakes orders at a much
lower level. The results, particularly the decrease in period with
longer ALC, show the period of the cycle to be determined primarily by
the strength of the self-ordering loop and not the life of capital.
The insensitivity to ALC shows the cycle is not created by the echo
effect that figures in some explanations of the long wave.2 4
Self-ordering also operates through other channels. During the
upswing of the cycle, rising delivery delays slow capital acquisition,
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further augmenting the backlog and lengthening lead times. To test the
importance of this channel, it was assumed that the capital sector has
absolute priority over the goods sector when demand for capital exceeds
capacity, and is always able to receive capital within the normal
delivery delay:
CAt=SLt/NDD (7')
GCAt=PRt-CAt (26')
The result is a 37-year cycle with an amplitude 70% as large as the
base case. The qualitative features are largely unchanged. With
priority over other sectors, the capital sector can catch up to orders
sooner and at a lower level. However, it is unlikely that such
allocation exists. All firms, to some extent, are involved in
purchasing from each other. Capital producers do not know the extent
to which their customers are coupled through self-ordering and
certainly do not consult an input/output table to assign priorities on
the basis of the technical coefficients of their customers. The
assumption of equal priorities is probably roughly correct in the
aggregate, at least for an approximately competitive economy.25
Self-ordering also operates through the backlog correction (Figure
2). The aggressiveness with which firms seek to maintain delivery
delays at normal levels is controlled by the time to adjust backlog
TAB. As shown in Table 4, the period and amplitude are inversely
·---·1----__
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related to TAB. While the amplitude is quite sensitive to TAB, the
period is relatively less sensitive.
Likewise, more aggressive adjustment of capital to desired levels
(Table 5) lengthens the period and increases the amplitude by boosting
orders even further above base-case levels for a given discrepancy
between desired and actual capital. Again the variation in the period
is less than the variation in the amplitude.
Speeding adjustment of the supply line, in contrast, is
stabilizing (Table 6). Since the capital and supply line corrections
oppose each other, more aggressive adjustment of the supply line
relative to the capital stock effectively reduces the strength of
self-ordering. Eliminating the supply line correction altogether means
capital once ordered is forgotten until it arrives, destabilizing the
system by causing overordering, as can be verified in simulations
without self-ordering.
As described in Figure 3, the rising delivery delay boosts the
desired supply line, adding still more to orders during the expansion
phase. To test the importance of this channel, equation 14 was
modified so that the desired supply line is always based on the normal
delivery delay, effectively eliminating the hoarding phenomenon
described by T. W. Mitchell:
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PDDCt-NDD (14')
The result is a cycle with the same period and an amplitude (measured
in output) 90% as large. The timing and character of the behavior are
virtually unaffected. Therefore, the decision rule for the desired
supply line, though contributing some amplification, does not appear to
play a strong role in the long wave.
The Role of Nonlinearity
The limit cycle behavior of the model implies one or more nonlineari-
ties bound what would otherwise be an expanding oscillation. Two
obvious nonlinearities are the limitation on orders as a fraction of
capacity (eq. 10), intended to capture bottlenecks and other
constraints on the rate of expansion) and the diminishing returns to
capital (eq. 16). Eliminating both nonlinearities by setting
COFt=ICOFt for ICOFt>.05 (10')
DCt=ICt (16')
yields a period of 75 years and an amplitude nearly 3.5 times greater
than the base case. The test clearly shows constraints on either the
level or rate of capital expansion to be important factors in bounding
the period and amplitude of the cycle. However, without these non-
linearities the cycle still reaches a finite steady-state amplitude,
suggesting another nonlinearity is primarily responsible for bounding
__111___
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the oscillation. That nonlinearity is the capacity utilization
formulation (eq. 2).
In both Figures 14 and 16, output falls below capacity when the
backlog drops below a level consistent with the normal delivery delay,
restraining the overshoot of output and preventing the backlog from
declining too far below its equilibrium value. If output were always
equal to capacity, however, backlog would decline further below its
equilibrium value, forcing larger cutbacks in investment and
destabilizing the cycle. Setting
PRt =PCt (1")
without self-ordering leaves the period largely unaffected but reduces
the damping ratio from 93% to 35%. When self-ordering is added,
equation 1''" results in an expanding oscillation which soon drives
backlog, delivery delay, and capital acquisitions below zero. As
further confirmation of the importance of capacity utilization, the
full model was simulated with
PRt=IP t (1'')
implying perfectly flexible capacity. The result is a highly damped
response with a single overshoot of capacity above its equilibrium
value.
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Thus the crucial nonlinearity is the relationship between backlog
and capacity. While constraints on the rate or level of capacity
expansion may limit the period and amplitude of the cycle,
fundamentally it is the fact that output can only rise as capacity
grows that creates the disequilibrium, and the fact that output must
fall as the backlog is depleted that limits it.27
Conclusions
The model presented here is not merely a set of equations which produce
a long cycle. The decision rules portrayed in the model are consistent
with the information-processing and decisionmaking capabilities of
economic agents. Further, the individual decision rules are locally or
intendedly rational: they yield rapid, orderly, and appropriate
adjustments to unanticipated shocks within the local environment of the
organizational subunits responsible for the decision. Yet as the
complexity of the environment grows, the overall rationality of the
system's response is degraded. The results demonstrate what Simon
(1947, p. 81] calls
"segments" of rationality...[the] behavior shows rational
organization within each segment, but the segments themselves
have no very strong interconnections.
The positive feedback loops created by self-ordering increase the
amplitude and lengthen the period of oscillations created by the
production and investment policies of the sector, policies which, from
the vantage point of the firm, are quite rational. Indeed, an
individual firm cannot distinguish orders that are part of the "true"
__ __II
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long-run demand from the "false" orders generated by amplification and
self-ordering. A firm or management team that attempted to turn away
orders or expand less aggressively on the grounds that it would cause
overexpansion in twenty years would not last long in the face of high
delivery delays and rapid growth.
The results show that the dynamic hypothesis of self-ordering is
sufficient to cause a long wave, given only the local rationality of
the decision rules and the physical structure of capital accumulation.
More precisely, the results show that self-ordering amplifies the
disequilibrium pressures created by the interaction of locally rational
decision rules and the lags in capital acquisition within a firm,
verifying Forrester's statement [1977, p. 534] that self-ordering
"creates the 50-year cycle out of what would otherwise be a 20-year
medium cycle in capital acquisition."
The model shows only the most fundamental feedback loops created
by self-ordering, relationships which primarily involve the physical
determination and allocation of output, are necessary to generate a
robust long wave. But the sufficiency of the basic self-ordering
channels does not mean other mechanisms are unimportant or irrelevant.
Self-ordering also creates additional feedback channels through, for
example, labor markets, growth expectations, prices, financial markets,
and aggregate demand. These are portrayed in the full National Model.
One would expect that adding these additional mechanisms would add to
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the net amplification created by self-ordering, strengthening the long
wave while adding "fine structure" to the behavior and permitting
realistic policy analysis.
The results should not be interpreted as excluding other mech-
anisms as amplifying or contributory factors in the long wave.
However, those who would argue for the primacy of other mechanisms have
yet to demonstrate the sufficiency of those mechanisms in a framework
that permits reproducible testing. In particular, the model shows the
long wave can arise with technology held completely constant (without
even the technological changes implicit in varying the mix of capital
and labor). The results suggest that the historical long-wave pattern
in innovations is the result of entrainment by the physical process of
self-ordering rather than vice-versa, as explained by Forrester [1977],
and by Graham and Senge [1980]. If the "long-wave theory of innova-
tion" more nearly describes the situation than the "innovation theory
of the long wave' favored by the neo-Schumpeterian school, policies
directed at stimulating innovation may be insufficient to mitigate the
effects of the current long-wave downturn.28
These issues have important policy implications, and it is hoped
that the methodological framework illustrated with the simple model
presented here can provide the common ground for systematic exploration
of the forces behind the long wave, contributing towards an integrated
theory of disequilibrium economic behavior.
--·---
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NOTES
0. This work is based on a model originally developed in 1979. I am
indebted to Dana Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jrgen Randers, Leif
Ervik, and Elizabeth Hicks for assistance with the 1979 version,
and to the Gruppen for Ressursstudier, Oslo, for its hospitality.
This research was supported in part by the Sponsors of the System
Dynamics National Model Project. All errors are mine.
1. Kondratiev [1935] remains the classic of early long-wave research.
Van Duijn [1983] provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of
long-wave theories and empirical evidence. A good overview of
early long-wave work and a sampling of recent work is also provided
by the August and October 1981 Futures 13(4,5), edited by
Christopher Freeman; Freeman et al. [1982] focus on unemployment
and innovation.
2. Long-wave dating is necessarily imprecise due to the lack of
reliable data. Van Duijn [1977] and [1981].
3. The renaissance of interest in Schumpeter's classic work [1939] is
illustrated in, e.g., Van Duijn [1981], Mensch et al. [1981], and
Kleinknecht [1981].
4. The notion of a dynamic hypothesis is discussed by Randers [1980].
5. Self-ordering is closely related to the investment accelerator,
which is commonly thought to be a factor in the 4- to 7-year
business cycle. However, recent work as well as classics such as
Metzler [1941] indicate the business cycle revolves around
inventory management and suggest the accelerator is primarily
involved in longer modes [Forrester 1982; Low 1980; Mass 1975].
6. Mass [1980] discusses amplification created by stock-and-flow
disequilibrium.
7. Monetary stimulus in the latter phases of the long-wave expansion
may account in part for the historic movement of aggregate prices
over the long wave.
8. On innovation, see the work of Mensch and Freeman. Content
analysis of political platforms has documented 50-year cycles in
both American and British political values that correspond to the
timing of the economic cycle [Namenwirth 1973; Weber 1981].
9. The behavior is triggered by exponentially autocorrelated noise in
exogenous consumer demand with a time constant of .25 years and a
standard deviation of 2.5% of the mean.
---··-r---·-----·lI-------
45
D-3410 46
10. Complete references cannot be given here. Excellent discussion and
references to the literature can be found in Kahneman et al. [1982]
and Hogarth [1980]. Morecroft [1983] provides an excellent
treatment of the relationships between bounded rationality and
system dynamics. See also Dutton and Starbuck [19711.
11. Hogarth [1980] discusses numerous separate sources of bias in
decisionmaking. Among the common fallacies of causal attribution
are the gambler's fallacy and the regression fallacy. [Tversky and
Kahneman 1974].
12. See Kahneman et al. [1982], especially Ch. 2, 9, 12, 20, and 23.
Goffman's [1959] "dramaturgic" model of public behavior is relevant
here: People constantly adjust their public performances so as to
enhance their status and competence in the eyes of others.
13. The model is formulated in continuous time as a set of integral
equations, and was simulated using Euler integration (see
Appendix).
14. Line B determines the minimum delivery delay because the actual
delivery delay or average residence time of an order in the backlog
is given by
DD = B/PR = B/(PC*CU).
When CU = b*(IP/PC) [for b>l and b*(IP/PC)<l, i.e., when CU lies
along line B]
DD = B/(PC*b(IP/PC)) = B/(b*IP)
but IP = B/NDD, so
DD = B/(b*B/NDD) = NDD/b = MDD
where MDD = Minimum delivery delay (years).
15. Though a more complete model would include a more sophisticated
production function with both variable labor and a variable work
week, the dynamics of labor acquisition are primarily associated
with the short-term business cycle (see note 5). However, since
rising wages contribute to the strength of self-ordering during a
long-wave expansion (Figure 5), omission of labor as an explicit
factor is likely to reduce the model's ability to generate a long
wave. For a dynamic model with multiple factors of production that
conforms to the principles of bounded rationality see Sterman
[1981, 1982].
16. Sterman [1980] contrasts the lumped capital stock used here to a
model with capital disaggregated by vintage. A more complete model
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would also include a variable average lifetime to represent
variations in the discard rate.
17. Investment resulting from growth expectations would have to be
included in a more complete model. The investment function of the
model is a simplified version of the System Dynamics National Model
investment function. Senge [1978, 1980] shows the SDNM function
reduces to the neoclassical investment function (e.g. Jorgenson
[1963], Jorgenson et al. [1970]) when a variety of equilibrium and
perfect information assumptions are made. The SDNM function is
shown to provide a better statistical fit of investment data and to
behave more plausibly than the neoclassical function when faced
with various test inputs.
18. The formulation for COF excludes order cancellations. Disallowing
cancellations is a simplifying assumption. A more complete model
would disaggregate unfilled orders from units under construction
and would represent cancellations explicitly [Sterman 1981]. The
formulation for COF smoothly approaches zero due to the aggregation
of firms, some of which will be ordering nonzero amounts even when
the average ICOF<0. The values of COF for ICOF<.05 were estimated
by assuming 1) the ordering function of a single firm is
COF=MAX(0,ICOF) and 2) ICOF for the aggregate sector is distributed
normally with a variance of .05/year.
19. The values of COF for ICOF>>.05 were derived by assuming the order
function of an individual firm was MIN(.30,ICOF) and that ICOF is
distributed normally with a variance of .05/year.
20. Growth expectations would have to be included in a more complete
model of demand forecasting, and would add amplification.
21. The equations for indicated production capacity (18 through 20)
reduce to:
IPC = EO + CB = EO + (B-IB)/TAB
= EO + (B-EO*NDD)/TAB
= EO(1 N) + B/TAB.TAB
The base case assumes TAB=NDD, so
IPC = B/TAB = B/NDD,
thus IPC always equals the production rate consistent with NDD,
which is why DD remains constant in the test.
22. The 20-year cycle is consistent with earlier models of capital
investment and empirical work on construction or Kuznets cycles.
See Forrester [1982], Low [1980], and Mass [1975] for models of
--w s l B1 _
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Kuznets-type cycles arising out of capital-investment policies.
For empirical work on Kuznets cycles see, e.g., Hickman [1963] and
Kuznets [1930].
23. A recent example is provided by the commercial construction
industry [Business Week, 4 October 1982, pp. 94-98].
24. Both Kondratiev and De Wolff invoked the echo effect to explain the
period of the long wave [Van Duijn 1983, pp. 62, 67].
25. The allocation issue raises the fascinating question of whether a
centrally planned economy could minimize or eliminate the long wave
through careful allocation of investment and output. Empirical
evidence is inconclusive, and analysis is made difficult by
entrainment of market and centrally planned economies through
trade.
26. Eliminating only one of the nonlinearities simply allows the system
to grow further until the remaining constraint becomes binding.
27. Though the behavior of the model is dominated by nonlinearity,
analysis of the eigenvalues of the linearized system verified the
crucial role of capacity utilization in controlling damping.
Linearizing around the initial equilibrium with eq. 1'' (CU=1)
yields dominant eigenvalues corresponding to expanding oscillation
with a period of 25.5 years and a growth rate of the envelope of
29%/year. In contrast, linearization with eq. 1'" (CU=IP/PC)
yielded eigenvalues corresponding to a highly damped oscillation
with a period of 23.8 years and a decay rate of the envelope of
19%/year. Intuitively, the slope of CU determines the relative
strengths of the oscillatory capital acquisition loop and the
stable first-order production scheduling loop. During the
expansion phase, utilization is at its maximum, and the unstable
loop dominates. As excess capacity develops, CU falls, and
dominance shifts to the stable loop, limiting the amplitude of the
cycle.
28. Both Freeman et al. [1982] and Van Duijn [1983] argue for stimulus
of innovation as prime components of an effective strategy to
counter the long wave. While renewed commitment to R&D is needed,
these results suggest dealing with excess physical capacity may be
more important [Mass and Senge 1981; Sterman 1983].
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Table 1. Parameters
Definition Value (years)
Average Life of Capital
Capital/Output Ratio
Normal Delivery Delay
Delivery Delay for Capital
Time to Adjust Backlog
Time to Average Orders
Time to Adjust Capital
Time to Adjust Supply Line
20
3
1.5
1.5
1.5
2
3
3
Sources/Comments:
ALC: Coen [1975] found service lives ranging from 8 to 22 years
for equipment and 20 to 50 years for structures. Sterman
(1981] estimated a 20-year lifetime for the aggregate of
plant and equipment.
COR: The mean value of real private capital stock/real GNP
(1958 $) from 1946 to 1970 = 2.9. [Historical Statistics
of the U.S. Series F-470/F-32].
NDD & DDC:
TAB:
TAO:
Mayer [1960] found mean lead times for plant and equipment
(planning to completion) of 22 months (5 months planning
and 17 months ordering and construction delays). Since
the sector represents a capital producer, NDD=DDC.
TAB should be comparable to NDD: Firms would not want to
try to adjust backlogs faster than products can be
delivered; but TAB>>NDD implies a sluggish response to
abnormal delivery delays. Senge 1978], using nondurable
manufacturing data, found no statistically significant
difference between NDD and TAB.
TAO should be greater than TAB to reflect the low weight
managers place on current and highly uncertain orders
compared to the much more certain backlog. Senge [1978]
found TAO>TAB (using shipments instead of orders as the
measure of demand).
TAC & TASL: Senge 1978] found TAC=12.1 quarters (est. std. dev. 2.2
quarters). TASL should be comparable to TAC so that
orders in planning are weighted in the order decision as
heavily as units in the productive stock. If TASL>TAC,
overordering results as capital on order is partially
ignored; if TASL<TAC, orders in the supply line are
counted more heavily in the investment decision than
capital itself.
Symbol
ALC
COR
NDD
DDC
TAB
TAO
TAC
TASL
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Table 2. Sensitivity to Capital/Output Ratio
COR (years) Period (years) "Damping Ratio "a
Steady-State Amplitudeb
(% of Base)
0
0.1
0.5
1.0
1.6
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
(base case)
20
20
20
20
20
23
34
49
55
60
.93
.88
.79
.59
-o
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0
0
0
0
20
40
100
140
150TO
150
"Damping Ratio" = 1 - Peak of cycle n/Peak of cycle n-l (measured with
respect to equilibrium values)
b Measured in Production Rate
__
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Table 3. Sensitivity to Average Life of Capital
ALC (years) Period
10
(years)
43
15
20 (Base Case)
45
49
4930
40 35
Steady-state Amplitudea (% of Base)
170
120
100
50
20
measured in production rate PR
Table 4. Sensitivity to Aggressiveness of Backlog Adjustment
TAB (years)
0.5
Period (years)
55
1.0
Steady-State Amplitudea (% of Base)
130
12053
1.5 (Base Case)
2.0
2.5
a measured in production rate PR
a
49
39
30
100
60
30
65
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Table 5. Sensitivity to Aggressiveness of Capital Stock Adjustment
TAC (years)
1.5
2
Period (years) Steady-State Amplitudea
56
(% of Base)
150
54 120
3 (Base Case) 49 100
4 37 40
5 31 20
measured in production rate
Table 6. Sensitivity to Aggressiveness of Supply-Line Correction
TASL (years)
1.5
Period (years) Steady-State Amplitudea (% of Base)
34
2
40
42 70
3 (Base Case)
4
o0
a measured in production rate
a
49
51
57
100
110
140
_ 
_ ___
_ 
______
66
D-3410
APPENDIX
Equations for Simulation
00010 DOPT DEFFL,SDOCL,WUOPT=O
00020 * A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE ECONOMIC LONG WAVE
00030 NOTE
00040 NOTE 11 FEBRUARY 1983
00050 NOTE
00060 NOTE JOHN D. STERMAN
00070 NOTE ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
00080 NOTE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
00090 NOTE ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
00100 NOTE CAMBRIDGE MA 02139
00110 NOTE
00120 NOTE CAPITAL SECTOR
00130 NOTE
00140 A KPR.K-KS R*KPC.K*KCU.K+(1-KSPR)*KIPC.K
00150 A KCU.K-TABHL(KCUT,KIP. K/KPC.K, O,2. O,.2)
00160 T KCUT-0/.3/.55/.75/.9/1/1/1/1/1/1
00170 A KIP.K-KB.K/KNDD
00180 A KPC.K-KC.K/KCOR
00190 L KC. KKC.J+(DT) (KCA.J-KCD.J)
00200 A KCD.K-KC.K/KALC
00210 A KCA.K-KSCA*(KSL.K/KDDC.K)+(1-KSCA)(KSL.K/KNDD)
00220 L KSL.K-KSL.J+(DT) (KCO.J-KCA.J)
00230 A KCO. KKC.K*KCOF.K
00240 A KCOF.K-TABXT(KCOFT,KICOF.K,-.1,.4,.05)
00250 T KCOFT-0/0/.02/.05/.1/.15/.2/.25/.28/.3/.3
00260 A KICOF.K-(KCD.K+KCC.K+KCSL.K)/KC.K
00270 A KCSL.K-(KDSL.K-KSL.K)/KTASL
00280 A KDSL.K-KPDDC.K*KCD.K
00290 A KPDDC.K=KNDDC*KEDDSL.K
00300 A KEDDSL.K-TABXT(KTPDDC,KDDC.K/KNDDC,O,3,.5)
00310 T KTPDDC-0/.5/1/1.5/2/2.5/3
00320 A KCC.K-(KDC.K-KC.K)/KTAC
00330 A KDC.K=KRC*KRDRC.K
00340 A KRDRC.K-TABXT(KTRDRC,KIC.K/KRC,-.5,7.5,.5)
00350 T KTRDRC-0/0/.5/1/1.5/2/2.5/3/3.5/4/4.5/5/5.4/5.7/5.9/6/6
00360 A KIC.K-KSDC*KIPC.K*KCOR+( 1 -KSDC)*KXDC.K
00370 A KIPC.K-KEO.K+KCB.K
00380 A KCB.K-(KB.K-KIB.K)/KTAB
00390 A KIB.K=KNDD*KEO.K
00400 L KEO.K-KEO.J+(DT/KTAO) (OR.J-KEO.J)
·_1_11_
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00410 NOTE
00420 NOTE
00430 NOTE
00440 C
00450 C
00460 C
00470 C
00480 C
00490 C
00500 C
00510 C
00520 C
00530 C
00540 N
00550 N
00560 N
00570 N
00580 N
00590 N
00600 N
00610 NOTE
00620 NOTE
00630 NOTE
00640 A
00650 A
00660 A
00670 A
00680 C
00690 A
00700 C
00710 C
00720 NOTE
00730 NOTE
00740 NOTE
00750 L
00760 N
00770 A
00780 A
00790 A
00800 C
00810 C
00820 C
00830 NOTE
00840 NOTE
00850 NOTE
00860 SPEC
00870 A
00880 C
00890 C
00900 C
00910 A
00920 C
00930 C
00940 C
PARAMETERS AND INITIAL VALUES
KNDD1l.5
KCOR-3
KALCo20
KTASL-3
KTAC-3
KTAB-1.5
KTAO=2
KSPR-1
KSCA-1
KSDC=1
KNDDCzKNDD
KDD-KNDD
KRC-KC
KPR=KPC
KC=(1-KSSO)*GCO*KCOR+KSSO*GCO*KCOR*KALC/(KALC-KCOR)
KSL-KDDC*KCD
KEO=KPC
COUPLING EQUATIONS
KOR.K-GCO.K+KSSO*KCO.K
KB.K-GSL.K+KSSO*KSL.K
KDDC.K=KSSO*KDD.K+(1-KSSO)*KNDD
KDD.K=KB.K/KPR.K
KSSO-1
KXDC. KKRC*( +STEP(KFIDC,KTIDC))
KFIDC-.05
KTIDC-I
GOODS SECTOR
GSL. K=GSL. J+(DT)(GCO.J-GCA.J)
GSL-GDDC*GCO
GCA.K-KSCA*(GSL.K/GDDC.K)+(1 -KSCA) (KPR.K-KCA.K)
GDDC.K=KDD.K
GCO.K-GRCO*(I+STEP(GFICO, GTICO))
GRCO-1E12
GFICO-.05
GTICO1
SIMULATION CONTROL PARAMETERS
DT-.0625/LENGTH-O
PLTPER.K=PLTPi+STEP(PLTP2-PLTP1,PLTIME)
PLTP1=0
PLTP2-2.5
PLTIME=1000
PRTPER.K=PRTP1+STEP(PRTP2-PRTP1,PRTIME)
PRTP1 O
PRTP2-0
PRTIME-1000
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LIST OF VARIABLES
TYPE DEFINITION
S SOLUTION INTERVAL (YEARS)
A GOODS SECTOR, CAPITAL ACQUISITIONS (UNITS/YEAR)
A GOODS SECTOR, CAPITAL ORDERS (UNITS/YEAR)
A GOODS SECTOR, DELIVERY DELAY FOR CAPITAL (YEARS)
C. GOODS SECTOR, FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN CAPITAL
ORDERS (FRACTION)
C GOODS SECTOR, REFERENCE CAPITAL ORDERS (UNITS/YEAR)
L GOODS SECTOR, SUPPLY LINE (UNITS)
N
C GOODS SECTOR, TIME TO INCREASE CAPITAL ORDERS (YEAR)
C CAPITAL SECTOR, AVARAGE LIFE OF CAPITAL (YEARS)
A CAPITAL SECTOR, BACKLOG (UNITS)
L CAPITAL SECTOR, CAPITAL STOCK (UNITS)
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL SECTOR,
CAPITAL ACQUISITIONS (UNITS/YEAR)
CORRECTION FOR BACKLOG (UNITS/YEAR)
CORRECTION FOR CAPITAL (UNITS/YEAR)
CAPITAL DISCARDS (UNITS/YEAR)
CAPITAL ORDERS (UNITS/YEAR)
CAPITAL ORDER FRACTION(FRACTION)
CAPITAL ORDER FRACTION TABLE
CAPITAL OUTPUT RATIO (YEARS)
CORRECTION FOR SUPPLY LINE (UNITS/YEAR)
CAPACITY UTILIZATION (FRACTION)
CAPACITY UTILIZATION TABLE
DESIRED CAPITAL (UNITS)
DELIVERY DELAY (YEARS)
DELIVERY DELAY FOR CAPITAL (YEARS)
DESIRED SUPPLY LINE (UNITS)
EFFECT OF DELIVERY DELAY ON
A CAPITAL SECTOR,
A CAPITAL SECTOR,
A CAPITAL SECTOR,
SUPPLY LINE (DIMENSIONLESS)
CAPITAL SECTOR, EXPECTED ORDERS (UNITS/YEAR)
C CAPITAL SECTOR, FRACTIONAL INCREASE IN DESIRED
CAPITAL (FRACTION)
A CAPITAL SECTOR, INDICATED BACKLOG (UNITS)
A CAPITAL SECTOR, INDICATED CAPITAL (UNITS)
A CAPITAL SECTOR, INDICATED CAPITAL ORDER FRACTION (FRACTION)
SYMBOL
DT
GCA
GCO
GDDC
GFICO
GRCO
GSL
GTICO
KALC
KB
KC
N
A
A
A
A
A
A
T
C
A
A
T
A
N
A
KCA
KCB
KCC
KCD
KCO
KCOF
KCOFT
KCOR
KCSL
KCU
KCUT
KDC
KDD
KDDC
KDSL
KEDDSL
L
N
KEO
KFIDC
KIB
KIC
KICOF
69
D-3410
KIP A CAPITAL SECTOR, INDICATED PRODUCTION (UNITS/YEAR)
KIPC A CAPITAL SECTOR, INDICATED PRODUCTION CAPACITY (UNITS/YEAR)
KNDD C CAPITAL SECTOR, NORMAL DELIVERY DELAY (YEARS)
KNDDC N CAPITAL SECTOR, NORMAL DELIVERY DELAY FOR CAPITAL (YEARS)
KOR A CAPITAL SECTOR, ORDER RATE (UNITS/YEAR)
KPC A CAPITAL SECTOR, PRODUCTION CAPACITY (UNITS/YEAR)
KPDDC A CAPITAL SECTOR, PERCEIVED DELIVERY DELAY FOR CAPITAL (YEARS)
KPR A CAPITAL SECTOR, PRODUCTION RATE (UNITS/YEAR)
KRC N CAPITAL SECTOR, REFERENCE CAPITAL (UNITS)
KRDRC A CAPITAL SECTOR, RATIO OF DESIRED TO REFERENCE
CAPITAL (DIMENSIONLESS)
KSCA C CAPITAL SECTOR, SWITCH FOR CAPITAL ACQUISITIONS
(DIMENSIONLESS)
KSDC C CAPITAL SECTOR, SWITCH FOR DESIRED CAPITAL (DIMENSIONLESS)
KSL L CAPITAL SECTOR, SUPPLY LINE (UNITS)
N
KSPR C CAPITAL SECTOR, SWITCH FOR PRODUCTION (DIMENSIONLESS)
KSSO C CAPITAL SECTOR, SWITCH FOR SELF ORDERING (DIMENSIONLESS)
KTAB C CAPITAL SECTOR, TIME TO ADJUST BACKLOG (YEARS)
KTAC C CAPITAL SECTOR, TIME TO ADJUST CAPITAL (YEARS)
KTAO C CAPITAL SECTOR, TIME TO AVERAGE ORDERS (YEARS)
KTASL C CAPITAL SECTOR, TIME TO ADJUST SUPPLY LINE (YEARS)
KTIDC C CAPITAL SECTOR, TIME TO INCREASE DESIRED CAPITAL (YEAR)
KTPDDC T CAPITAL SECTOR, TABLE FOR PERCEIVED DELIVERY
DELAY FOR CAPITAL
KTRDRC T CAPITAL SECTOR, TABLE FOR RATIO OF DESIRED TO
REFERENCE CAPITAL
KXDC A CAPITAL SECTOR, EXOGENOUS DESIRED CAPITAL (UNITS)
LENGTH S SIMULATION LENGTH (YEARS)
PLTIME C PLOT START TIME (YEAR)
PLTPER A PLOT PERIOD (YEARS)
PLTP1 C PLOT PERIOD 1 (YEARS)
PLTP2' C PLOT PERIOD 2 (YEARS)
PRTIME C PRINT START TIME (YEAR)
PRTP A PRINT PERIOD (YEARS)
PRTP1 C PRINT PERIOD 1 (YEARS)
PRTP2 C PRINT PERIOD 2 (YEARS)
STEP STEP FUNCTION
TABHL FUNCTION FOR NONLINEAR RELATIONSHIP
TABXT FUNCTION FOR NONLINEAR RELATIONSHIP
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